Abstract
Introduction
Following a serious error, Reuters suggested that I envisaged alliances with Jobbik and Golden Dawn. I have declared exactly the opposite [...] , Asked 'with whom will you not ally yourselves?', I replied:
Jobbik, Ataka and Golden Dawn among others (Marine Le Pen, the Leader of Front National) (The Guardian 2014).
Whatever Marine Le Penn is trying to do with Le Front National, anti-Semitism, is still deeply embedded in that party, and for that principle political reason, we are not going to work with them now, or at any point in the future (Nigel Farage, the Former Leader of UKIP) (UKIP East 2014).
These two statements are made by the leaders of the most prominent far-right parties of The far-right parties have never been thought to constitute a single model, however the recent example of the demonstration of the red lines between far-right parties revitalizes the questions of their differences one more time since their conceptions about each other are strong enough to prevent them making strategic moves that could clearly be in their benefit. In order to reach the differences of political parties, comparisons are traditionally made on the basis of ideology, organization, and policies. One right place to make such a comparison is the European Parliament by looking at their trans-European organization instead of intra-party organization; and the reflection of their ideologies to policy preferences through voting behaviour. Far-right parties have been contesting for European elections for decades and gradually increased their representation in the EP. The increasing powers of both the EU and the EP make this representation very valuable in order the have a word in the working and the future of Europe.
The fundamentally Eurosceptic nature of far-right parties only makes the issue more interesting since they contest for and work in an institution that is one the main symbols of everything they are opposed for in the European integration process. Therefore, the article aims to reach an understanding for the differences of far-right parties by analyzing their trans-European organization, ideology and policies during the term of EP between 2009 and 2014. By selecting key votes from the most salient areas for far-right; the voting behaviours of the far-right parties are compared on the basis of their political groups in order to reveal whether their conceived differences about each other are reflected upon their voting preferences about the most salient issues in. I argue that their conceived differences about each other do not reflect on the voting preferences on salient issues, and the deviations are caused by the country-specific reasons.
Within the scope of this article, I firstly provide the methodology of the research; followed by a background on the far-right political parties in Europe and far-right groups within the EP. At the final part, I analyze the voting behaviour of the far-right parties and discuss the results.
Methodology
The aim of this research is to compare the far-right parties within the EP in accordance with their party groupings, ideologies, and policies. The argument is that the cohesion of the two fictional groups that could be formed between far-right parties; [1. far-right members of Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) and Non-Inscripts (Independents-NI) 2. far-right members of EFD, NI, and European Conservatists and Reformists (ECR)] would be higher than the EFD, which consists of both far-right and non far-right members, for the selected votes. I employ mathematical calculations and textual analysis to analyse the data.
There is not a consensus on literature for the criteria or methods to employ to identify the far-right parties. Ignazi (2006) focuses on spatial location of parties and their anti-system characteristics. Betz & Immerfal (1998) , on the other hand, emphasizes on the radicalism and populism. Eatwell (2003) identifies nationalism as the central character of far-right parties, while Mudde (2007) argues it is nativism, populism and authoritarianism. As for the methods, Carter (2005), Mudde (2007) , Harrison & Bruter (2011) use comparative manifesto and program studies; Kitschelt & McGann (1995) and Norris (2005) prefer the method of expert surveys. In order to identify the far-right parties for this research, I compare these studies and analyze a broad list of political parties. Among them, I select the ones that could acquire seats in the EP as a result of the European Elections of 2009. (Kreilinger 2014, p. 20) . 
A Background for the Far-Right Parties
The existence of the far-right political parties in the European political scene is not a new phenomenon, however their increasing support is. While a couple of far-right political parties were established during 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, their electoral success remained limited until 1990s.
Since 1990s, the number and visibility of the far-right political parties in Europe have been increasing with diverse electoral outcomes.
The emergence and the success of the far-right parties are tried to be understood within the terms of supply-side and demand-side theories. Demand-side theories focus on the reasons for the emergence of a demand from the society for far-right parties. The traditional approach is 'the single-issue thesis' which connects the rise of far-right with the increasing immigration (Inglehart 1990 ), however contemporary far-right parties have broad party programs which exceeds only immigration issue (Eatwell 2003; Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Mudde 2007) . The second one is the 'anti-establishment' nature of the far-right parties, which emphasizes on the 'protest' or 'resentment' votes due to the disappointment derived from conventional political structures (Betz 1994; Eatwell 2003; Ignazi 2006 ). The disappointment is not only related with the conventional politics but also related with the 'new politics' which threatens the traditional values of family and society such as same-sex marriage; or threatens the material benefits and employment prospects such as environmentalism (Norris 2005) .
Although far-right parties have broad political programs to attract more than resentment votes, they surely benefit from the resentment and disappointment of the electors. Among the supply-side theories, on the other hand, focus is on what is supplied to the society from the farright parties; as Betz (1994) , Betz & Immerfall (1998) suggest. By exploiting the failure of conventional politics, far-right parties demand to replace representative democracy by direct democracy in order to reflect the free will of the people and demand referendums often (Betz & Immerfall 1998; Carter 2005; Hainsworth 2008 ). They are also successful to exploit specific issues such as affirmative action, immigration, multiculturalism (Betz 1994; Betz & Immerfall 1998, p. 5 ).
Hainsworth (2000, p. 9) defines those issues as nationalism, xenophobia, racism, anti-democracy, and support for a strong state, welfare chauvinism and a strong emphasis upon law and order. Kitschelt & McGann (1995) proposes a winning-formula for far-right which is consisted of the approximation of centre left and right parties; the policy of free market economy; authoritarian and ethno-centric discourse. Betz & Immerfall (1998, p. 5 ) also underlines the support of the far-right parties for the free-market economics unlike the classical fascism or the post-war rightist movements. Ellinas (2010) European elections are, usually, accepted as the 'second-order elections', that they come after the main national elections as local elections (Reif & Schmitt, 1980) . MEPs are dependent on the performances of their national parties rather than their political groups in the EP; and the main area of contestation is the performance of governments rather than the performance of European political groups. Due to this nature of the European elections, during the election campaigns 'national' rather than 'European' issues are debated. However, recent studies suggest that because of the economic crisis, the attention to European matters have been increased and the thesis of 'second-order elections' do not grasp the whole picture anymore (Nissen, 2014, p. 13) . Thus, the main differences between European and national elections can be summarized as 'lower turnout than national elections; better performance of small parties; possible electoral losses of incumbent national government parties; better results for parties with strong European dimension either positive or negative' (Nissen 2014, p. 13) .
Within the EP, political parties form European Political Groups to organize better to defend their ideological positions by an efficient division of labour. Forming groups in the EP has several benefits for the political parties such as more funding, more talking times, more committee memberships with key committee positions, and better chances to exert influence on policies.
Because of these advantages, far-right parties have been involved in the efforts for forming groups within the EP. However, these efforts failed many times. 
The Voting Behaviour on Key Votes
Far-right parties are inherently Eurosceptic; however their opposition to European integration differs. Most of the far-right parties do not have any objection for intergovernmental economic cooperation among similarly structured European countries. Their objection is mainly directed to increasing competences of the supranational institutions of the EU, and the growing areas of supranational cooperation. They claim that the legitimacy of the unelected institutions of the EU is highly questionable, thus its policies do not reflect the true will of the people. They call for radical reforms to restore the national sovereignty of the member states and give power back to true representatives of the people; to national parliaments.
They are strongly against any path leading to federalism. They often use the term 'Europe of the Nations' first employed by Charles de Gaulle to underline his vision of Europe with sovereign states rather than a federal 'United States of Europe'. Most of them favour the renegotiation of the treaties in accordance with their national interests, and to secure the supremacy of national constitutions over the community law. They threaten to withdraw from the EU if it will not happen.
During the 2009-14 term of the EP, the subjects of economics and immigration gained significant importance due to the economic crisis and increasing immigration to the and within the EU. These two subjects are also one of the most important common themes of the European far right and their main reasons to oppose to European integration in supranational terms. Thus, the agreement index for the key votes about these subjects are calculated in order to analyse the cohesion of the far-right parties. Table 3 shows the results that are discussed in detail in the next parts. 
Economic and Monetary Affairs
There is a difference between the attitudes of contributor and recipient member states for the subject of economic and monetary affairs. The far-right parties from net-contributor member states defend a rebate from their contribution to the EU budget (FPÖ 2014; FN 2014; VB 2014; PS 2014) ; the others also demand to negotiate the unfavourable clauses for their national interests For the resolution on monitoring on budget deficits of the member states (4), the agreement index is 0.48 for EFD; 0.75 for EFD+NI; and 0.72 for EFD+ECR+NI. Within EFD, LAOS and VB voted in favour of the resolution, and SNS abstained; within independents Jobbik and PRM voted in favour of the resolution. TB/LNNK is abstained.
One of the solutions for sovereign debt problems of the member states was the introduction of the 'Eurobonds', which is a collective bond to regulate financial flows (2). In Apart from non-EU immigration, far-right parties also have strong opinions on intra-EU immigration. According to Community Law, EU citizens have the freedom of circulation, which entitles them to move, work or benefit from social security systems as the EU citizens. Especially after the CEECs enlargement, the intra-EU immigration numbers increased dramatically. In fact, Romania and Bulgaria were not given the free circulation right during their accession. They faced with derogations, which were only fully removed as of 1 January 2014. When the increasing migrant flows coincided with the economic crisis and economic troubles for the receiving countries, the magnitude of the opposition also increased.
Although not being a EU member state, Switzerland had a free circulation of people with the EU. During a recent referendum in 2013, the far-right party of Switzerland achieved with a very small margin to introduce the quota system for the EU immigrants. Far-right parties from receiving countries demand either exit from this system, or they seek the Swiss formula. The opposition of the far-right parties to EU immigration is not only derived from employment concerns but also from their burden on the welfare system. They believe that the EU immigrants cause an economic burden to schooling, healthcare, social housing expenses, and unemployment despite several studies proved otherwise (Dustmann 2014 UKIP (2014) suggests social housing only for those whose parents and grandparents were born locally. FN (2014) demands family allowances to be reserved for families with at least one parent is French; social security to be given only after a continuous residency and contribution to the system; and the priority for French families for social housing.
These views found their reflection on the voting for the motion for the resolution for the social housing in the EU in order to tackle poverty and promote social inclusion and cohesion (5).
While most of the far-right parties voted against the motion; LAOS from EFD, and Jobbik and PRM voted in favour of it. Still, the agreement index is 0.65 for EFD, while it is 0.72 both with independents and ECR. The motion had a very strong Roma perspective, as it is the most marginalized group of the EU. This was another reason of its rejection by the far-right parties. Claudio Morganti (European Parliament 2013) from LN made it clear that his party prefers to make investments for their own nationals rather than Roma. Dimitar Stoyanov (European Parliament 2013) from ATA also denoted that Roma do not deserve these investments since 'they ruin them regularly and do not pay their obligations as citizens'.
Out of estimated 10-12 million Roma population in Europe, 6 million live in the EU, which makes them the largest minority group of the EU. With the CEECs enlargement, Roma problem became a EU wide problem since they have significant Roma population and problems related to it. Roma is the most discriminated minority in the EU and continues to be the target of the far-right of both CEECs and Western European countries due to the intra-EU immigration.
They are often associated with unemployment due to laziness; exploiting welfare system; high absence levels at the school; high birth rates, low hygiene; and crime. Jobbik suggests forming a specific police force to prevent Roma crimes (2014, p. 12), so does ATA. SNS suggests establishing boarding schools for Roma children to force them to continue their education (2014, p. 8 ). This situation is reflected upon the votes of Roma Strategy of Europe (6); the agreement index of EFD is 0.51, and it is 0.70 and 0.66 respectively for EFD+NI and EFD+NI+ECR.
Similarly, from the EFD, only SNS, LAOS, and PS voted in favour of the strategy while PRM from independents and TB/LNNK from ECR also voted in favour.
Conclusion
An intriguing puzzle is the starting point of this research. During the election campaigns for 2014 European elections, several far-right leaders denounce the possibility of alignment with each other due to their conceived racism. These convictions prevent them to form strategic and beneficial cooperation in the EP. Based on a counterfactual question, this article investigates whether the cohesion of a fictional far-right group that would be formed between all of the farright MEPs; woud be higher than the EFD group that some far-right members preferred to form by aligning with some non-far right parties.
The article shows far-right members of EFD are more compatible with independent farright members in ideological terms according the findings of the key votes from the areas of economic and monetary policy and immigration. The agreement index, thus the cohesion is higher in all cases when the votes of far-right members of EFD group and Independents are calculated.
This finding is important since it proves that their conceived differences about each other that prevent them to form a group together do not reflect to the policy level. They share the similar policy preferences for the most salient issues.
Although some of the most prominent Europan far-right parties try to emphasize more on their diversity, this article shows how united the European far-right parties in their diversity, however in a fundamentally different sense they originally suggest. The diversity of the European far-right parties is not derived from their conceived differences about each other like they claim, or to put it another way, their racism levels. In fact, their voting behaviour on salient issues proves they are united in that sense. The diversity is derived from the country-specific reasons. Thus, it is more than fair to employ the motto of European Union for European far-right parties: 'United in diversity'.
